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JUSTICE POWELL'S CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS
GEORGE CLEMON FREEMAN, JR.*
A Justice's long term impact on the Supreme Court is difficult to
predict. When there are wide philosophical differences among the sitting
Justices, the votes of a "swing" Justice like Justice Powell have special
significance in determining the controlling law of his day. We will continue
to see analyses of the closely divided 5 to 4 opinions in which Powell
participated and specultion on how those precarious precedents will fare
as Powell and other Justices who participated in them depart and others
take their places.
Although the votes of a Justice are one measure of his contemporary
contribution to constitutional law, a Justice's influence on future generations
is based primarily on his written opinions. Opinions live on in several ways.
Some are great landmark or seminal opinions that over time become accepted
as such. Sometimes they are majority opinions, sometimes dissents. Other
opinions survive because they are instructive of the ordered process of
analysis and decision.
A number of articles have been published about Justice Powell's life
and his opinions.1 It would serve little purpose to repeat what has been said
elsewhere. But it may be of benefit to discuss briefly about thirty of Justice
Powell's most significant constitutional opinions2 to see what picture of his
* B.A. Vanderbilt, 1950; LL.B. Yale, 1956. Member of the Virginia, District of
Columbia, and Alabama bars. Partner, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia and Wash-
ington, D.C. Mr. Freeman practiced law with Justice Powell from 1957 until Justice Powell
joined the Court in 1971.
1. See, e.g., A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARv. L. REv. 395 (1987)
(includes articles by Justice O'Connor, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Gerald Gunther, George C.
Freeman, Jr., Oliver W. Hill and Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III); Dedication, Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., 39 BAYLOR L. REv. No. 3 (1988) (includes tributes by Justices White and
Stevens, Judges Wright and Brown, Charles Allen Wright, George C. Freeman, Jr., and F.
Win. McCapin); Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence
of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987). For earlier articles on Justice Powell, see The
Symposium in Honor of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 68 VA. L. REv. 161 (1982) (includes
articles by BeVier, Estreicher, Freund, Martin, Merrill, Oaks, Stephan and Whitman); Gunther,
In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 1001 (1972); Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH.
L. REv. 445 (1972); Maltz, Portrait of a Man in the Middle - Mr. Justice Powell, Equal
Protection, and the Pure Classification Problem, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 941 (1979); Vrofsky, Mr.
Justice Powell and Education: The Balancing of Competing Values; 13 J.L. & EDUC. 581
(1984); Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr. Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection
Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RicH. L. REv. 181 (1975). See also Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Reflections, 96 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIoGRApnY 315 (July 1988); ANNE HOBSON FREsmaN,
THE STYLE OF A LAW FiRM, HuNTON & Wiri.iAs 1901-1986 (Algonquin Press, Chapel Hill,
N.C., forthcoming).
2. In his fifteen years on the Court, Justice Powell wrote more than 500 opinions; 254
were opinions of the Court.
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judicial philosophy emerges. The selection is somewhat arbitrary, but these
cases suffice to illustrate Justice Powell's central role on the Court.'
These opinions fall into several broad categories: the first (free speech
and the establishment clause), fourth (search and seizure), eighth (capital
punishment and proportionality), tenth, eleventh and fourteenth amend-
ments and the abstention and implied rights of action cases (the last five
categories involve intertwined issues of federalism, sovereign immunity,
separation of powers, equal protection, and due process). In discussing
them, I do not imply by the order mentioned any ranking of relative
importance.
Tim FiRsT AMENDMENT
Justice Powell's most important "free speech/free press" first amend-
ment opinions are his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,4 his
concurring opinion in Gannett Co., v. DePasquale and his opinion for the
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.6 Perhaps his most important freedom
of religion opinion is his opinion for the Court in Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist.7 His views there are further developed in his more
recent concurring opinions in Wallace v. Jaffree, Aguilar v. Felton,9 and
Edwards v. Aguillard.10
FREE SPEECH/FREE PRESS
In Saxbe the Court upheld the provision in the policy statement of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons that prohibits interviews between newsmen and
inmates of federal medium and maximum security prisons. The Court
reasoned that the "visitation policy does not place the press in any less
advantageous position than the public generally"'" and " '[n]ewsmen have
no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that
afforded the general public.' "12
Powell, joined by Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the ground that
"the interview ban impermissibly burdens First Amendment freedoms.'
3
3. The criteria used to select the cases reviewed in this article were my assessment of
(1) the opinion's immediate and continuing importance, (2) its representative quality of other
Powell opinions in the same field and (3) the social and legal significance of the subject area.
Although the abstention and implied rights of action cases discussed technically are not
constitutional, they are included to emphasize Justice Powell's strong views on federalism,
separation of powers and judicial policymaking.
4. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell J., dissenting).
5. 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
8. 472 U.S. 38, 62 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
9. 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
10. 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2584 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974).
12. Id. at 850 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)).
13. Id. at 850.
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Powell's basic criticism of the majority's approach was that it was too
simplistic and the result was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution when
applied to the facts of modern life:
The Court's resolution of this case has the virtue of simplicity.
Because the Bureau's interview ban does not restrict speech or
prohibit publication or impose on the press any special disability,
it is not susceptible to constitutional attack. This analysis delineates
the outer boundaries of First Amendment concerns with unambig-
uous clarity. It obviates any need to enter the thicket of a particular
factual context in order to determine the effect on First Amendment
values of a nondiscriminatory restraint on press access to infor-
mation. As attractive as this approach may appear, I cannot join
it. I believe that we must look behind bright-line generalities,
however sound they may seem in the abstract, and seek the meaning
of First Amendment guarantees in light of the underlying realities
of a particular environment. Indeed, if we are to preserve First
Amendment values amid the complexities of a changing society, we
can do no less.
14
Powell, practical and pragmatic, did not hesitate to plunge into the
thicket of the facts of Saxbe. In so doing, he found
that personal interviews are crucial to effective reporting in the
prison context. A newsman depends on interviews in much the same
way that a trial attorney relies on cross-examination. Only in face-
to-face discussion can a reporter put a question to an inmate and
respond to his answer with an immediate follow-up question. Only
in an interview can the reporter pursue a particular line of inquiry
to a satisfactory resolution or confront an inmate with discrepancies
or apparent inconsistencies in his story. Without a personal interview
a reporter is often at a loss to determine the honesty of his informant
or the accuracy of the information received .... [C]orrespondence
is decidedly inferior to face-to-face discussion as a means of ob-
taining reliable information about prison conditions and inmate
grievances. In addition, the prevalence of functional illiteracy among
the inmate population poses a serious difficulty; many prisoners are
simply incapable of communicating effectively in. writing.Is
The Bureau of Prisons' across-the-board ban on prisoner interviews
thus precluded "effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate griev-
ances."' 16 Because the "interview ban is categorical in nature" and "[i]ts
consequence is to preclude accurate and effective reporting on prison con-
14. Id. at 875.
15. Id. at 853-55.
16. Id. at 857.
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ditions and inmate grievances," it "substantially impairs a core value of
the First Amendment.' ' 7 This is because
[w]hat is at stake ... is the societal function of the First Amendment
in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs....
And public debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be
informed.' 8
Later Powell added that "fain informed public depends on accurate and
effective reporting by the news media."' 9
Thus, Powell continued:
This constitutionally established role of the news media is
directly implicated here. For good reasons, unrestrained public
access [to federal inmates] is not permitted. The people must there-
fore depend on the press for information concerning public insti-
tutions. The Bureau's absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews
negates the ability of the press to discharge that function and
thereby substantially impairs the right of the people to a free flow
of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government. The
underlying right is the right of the public generally. The press is
the necessary representative of the public's interest in this context
and the instrumentality which effects the public's right.20
But while an across-the-board ban on media interviews with prisoners
cannot withstand first amendment scrutiny, it by no means follows that
across-the-board media access to prisoners must be permitted:
Governmental regulations should not be policed in the name of a
"right to know" unless they significantly affect the societal function
of the First Amendment. I therefore believe that a press interview
policy that substantially accommodates the public's legitimate inter-
est in a free flow of information and ideas about federal prisons
should survive constitutional review. The balance should be struck
between the absolute ban of the Bureau and an uninhibited license
to interview at will.
Thus, the Bureau could meet its obligation under the First
Amendment and protect its legitimate concern for effective penal
administration by rules drawn to serve both purposes without un-
dertaking to make an individual evaluation of every interview re-
quest.2'
In Saxbe we see Powell willing to give the press something, but less
than it demanded. As far as access to sources of the news in the govern-
17. Id. at 860-61.
18. Id. at 862-63.
19. Id. at 863.
20. Id. at 864.
21. Id. at 872-73.
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ment's possession, the press has no constitutionally mandated access in its
own right derived from "freedom of the press." The press' right to limited
access is instead derived from the public's right to know the crucial facts
on how government operates.
Five years later in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,22 the Court held that
the sixth amendment right to a public trial is solely for the benefit of a
defendant. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that members of the press and
public have a right under the first amendment to attend criminal trials,
such a right is not unlimited and was outweighed in this case by the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Powell concurred to make the following points:
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I would address the
question that it reserves. Because of the importance of the public's
having accurate information concerning the operation of its criminal
justice system, I would hold explicitly that petitioner's reporter had
an interest protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in
being present at the pretrial suppression hearing. As I have argued
in Saxbe ... this constitutional protection derives, not from any
special status of members of the press as such, but rather because
"[i]n seeking out the news the press ... acts as an agent of the
public at large," each individual member of which cannot obtain
for himself "the information needed for the intelligent discharge of
his political responsibilities."
The right of access to courtroom proceedings, of course, is not
absolute. It is limited both by the constitutional right of defendants
to a fair trial ... and by the needs of government to obtain just
convictions and to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive infor-
mation and the identity of informants. ... The task of determining
the application of these limitations in each individual trial necessarily
falls almost exclusively upon the trial court asked to exclude mem-
bers of the press and public from the courtroom. 23
Again focusing carefully on the particular facts of the case, Powell
concluded that
[t]he question ... is whether the First Amendment right of
access ... was adequately respected in the present case. ...
... In the court's view, the nature of the evidence to be
considered at the hearing, the young age of two of the defendants,
and the extent of the publicity already given the case had indicated
that an open hearing would substantially jeopardize the fairness of
the defendants' subsequent trial. 24
22. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
23. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-99 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
24. Id. at 401-02.
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In this Gannett concurrence we see two subsidiary themes that reappear
in many Powell opinions. The first is Powell's insistence that when a balance
must be struck between competing values in a context that is heavily fact
dependent, "due deference" should be given "to the proximity of the trial
judge to the surrounding circumstances." '25 We also should note Powell's
solicitude for the "young age of the two defendants, ' 26 a factor he em-
phasized again in the context of his capital punishment dissent in Burger
v. Kemp.
27
Powell's point that the first amendment mandates realistic access to the
facts necessary for informed public discussion of governmental affairs
subsequently became the approach of a majority of the Justices of the
Court six years later in the seminal opinions in Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia.28 There the Court addressed the issue reserved in Gannett and,
although there was no majority opinion, the effect of the judgment was to
afford reporters standing to contest a court order excluding the public from
a murder trial. Although Powell had recused himself in that case, the
plurality and concurring opinions echo Powell's reasoning. Chief Justice
Burger, in his opinion for himself and Justices White and Stevens, stated
that
[t]he First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, pro-
hibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These ex-
pressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. 29
Justice Stevens in a separate concurrence added:
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded
virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or
ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of
newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection what-
soever. ...
Twice before, the Court has implied that any governmental
restriction on access to information, no matter how severe and no
matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally acceptable so long
as it did not single out the press for special disabilities not applicable
to the public at large. In a dissent joined by MR.. JusTIcE BRNNAN
and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL in Saxbe ... MR. JUSTICE PowELL
unequivocally rejected the conclusion that "any governmental re-
25. Id. at 403.
26. Id. at 402.
27. 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 32 (1987).
28. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
29. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
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striction on press access to information, so long as it is nondiscrim-
inatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment concern."
Id. at 857 (emphasis in original).... Today, however, for the first
time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference
with access to important information is an abridgment of the




Implicit in this structural role is not only "the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,"
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), but
also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well
as other civic behavior-must be informed.
31
Finally, in his concurrence Justice Stewart observed that:
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees "the accused" the
right to a public trial, does not confer upon representatives of the
press or members of the general public any right of access to a
trial. But the Court explicitly left open the question whether such
a right of access may be guaranteed by other provisions of the
Constitution, id. at 391-393. MR. JUSTICE POWELL expressed the
view that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do extend at least
a limited right of access even to pretrial suppression hearings in
criminal cases, id. at 397-403 (concurring opinion).... The re-
maining Members of the Court were silent on the question.
Whatever the ultimate answer to that question may be with
respect to pretrial suppression hearings in criminal cases, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public
a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal.
32
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 is another example of Powell's helping
the Court to find solid middle ground in an area where immediate past
decisions had created major uncertainties. Prior to the Gertz decision in
1974, the scope of the first amendment's limitations on libel law was unclear.
The Court's landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 4 had
held that the first amendment bars liability for defamation of a public
official absent proof of knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard of the
truth. Three years later a curiously divided Court extended this strict
standard of proof to "public figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
30. Id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 598-99 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19881
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and Associated Press v. Walker.35 Justice Harlan announced the decision in
an analysis that applied a different standard where a "public figure" was
libeled: "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers." ' a6 Only three other Justices joined
him. Chief Justice Warren, in an opinion concurring in the result, articulated
the extension of the New York Times burden on "public officials" to
"public figures" in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and White.3 7
Justice Black, joined by Douglas in a separate opinion, repeated their views
on absolute immunity from liability for defamation, but joined in Warren's
view on the extension of New York Times to public figures in order to give
it majority status.3"
A few years later in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.39 the Court split
again. This time the dispute was whether the New York Times burden
applied to all plaintiffs, private individuals as well as government officials
and public figures, in defamation cases. In a plurality opinion announcing
the decision of the Court, Justice Brennan said that the Times standard
applied across the board if the statements concerned "a matter [that] is a
subject of public or general interest." 4 Justice Black concurred in the result
on other grounds.4 1 White also concurred for a different reason.42 Justice
Douglas did not participate. Harlan43 and Marshall" wrote separate dissents,
with Stewart joining Marshall's opinion. All three dissenters agreed that the
states should be free to permit recovery for defamation based on fault, but
they differed as to whether punitive damages could be imposed. Harlan
thought punitive damages could be imposed under certain circumstances;
Marshall and Stewart did not.
In Gertz Powell resolved these questions for a majority consisting of
himself and Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist. In Gertz
a youth had been killed by a policeman who subsequently was convicted of
murder in the second degree. The family of the victim had hired a lawyer
to represent them in subsequent civil litigation against the policeman. This
lawyer was attacked in an article published in a monthly magazine, which
charged, among other things, that he was a "Leninist" or "Communist-
fronter" and was participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local
law enforcement agencies. The lawyer sued the publisher for libel in a
35. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
36. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
37. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
38. Id. at 170 (Black, J., concurring).
39. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
40. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
41. Id. at 57-62 (Black, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 57-78 (White, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 62-87 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. Because the statements in the article constituted libel per se
under state law, the trial judge allowed the case to go to the jury on the
issue of damages. The jury awarded $50,000. But thereafter the judge set
aside the verdict, concluding that the New York Times standard should
apply notwithstanding the fact the lawyer was neither a public official nor
a public figure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom that had just come down, finding
that the article discussed an issue of significant public interest. The Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting Rosenbloom's extension of the New York Times
standard to defamation suits brought by private citizens. 4
Powell's opinion began by acknowledging the high value of public
debate. Powell further acknowledged that erroneous statements are inevitable
in free debate and that prior Court decisions "recognize that a rule of strict
liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy
of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship." 46 Accord-
ingly, "'the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.' The First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters." 47 The question then is where to draw the line.
Powell rejected the "absolute protection" position of Justices Black
and Douglas that would afford "unconditional and indefeasible immunity
from liability for defamation. ' 4 He did so because "[t]he need to avoid
self-censorship by the news media is ... not the only societal value at
issue."' 49 In Powell's view the state has a competing interest in "the
compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory
45. 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Gertz Justice Blackmun,
who had joined Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, shifted to give Powell the needed
fifth for a majority. Id. at 353-54. He explained that:
Although the Court's opinion in the present case departs from the rationale of the
Rosenbloom plurality, in that the Court now conditions a libel action by a private
person upon a showing of negligence, as contrasted with a showing of willful or
reckless disregard, I am willing to join, and do join, the Court's opinion and its
judgment for two reasons:
1. By removing the specters of presumed and punitive damages in the absence
of New York Times malice, the Court eliminates significant and powerful motives
for self-censorship that otherwise are present in the traditional libel action. ...
2. The Court was sadly fractionated in Rosenbloom. A result of that kind
inevitably leads to uncertainty. I feel that it is of profound importance for the court
to come to rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority
position that eliminates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity. If my
vote were not needed 'to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view. A
definite ruling, however, is paramount.
Id. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
46. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
47. Id. at 340-41 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
48. Id. at 341.
49. Id.
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falsehood."' 50 Thus "[s]ome tension necessarily exists between the need for
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing
wrongful injury .... ',5" Powell then observed that in the Court's "contin-
uing effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing
concerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of
speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise."
'52
The New York Times standard is "an accommodation between this concern
and the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions brought
by public persons.
'53
Then Powell proceeded to draw the new line. "A different rule should
obtain with respect" to "injury to the reputation of private individuals.
'54
Powell advanced four reasons to justify this distinction.
First, "[p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have
a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private
individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable
to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly
greater. 55
Second, "[the] individual who decides to seek governmental office must
accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public af-
fairs."
56
Third, the same consideration applies to "public figures" because
for the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles
of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment.
57
Fourth, the test of the Rosenbloom plurality would force "state and
federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address
issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not. ' 58
After drawing a line between public officials and public figures on the
one hand and private individuals on the other, Powell then held that as to
the latter "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
50. Id.
51. Id. at 342.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 343.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 344.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 345.
58. Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
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may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." 59 But even here the state's discretion is not unlimited. "[T]he
States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least
when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.' '6
Powell then turned to the classification of a person as a public figure:
That designation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In
some instances an individual may achieve such a pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in
all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects him-
self or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case
such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.
61
In applying these two tests to the facts before the Court, Powell afforded
further insights into both. As to "pervasive fame or notoriety," general
"participation in community or professional affairs" 62 is not enough. It
was significant in Gertz that none of the jurors had ever heard of the
plaintiff prior to the libel suit. As to the second test, involvement in the
public issue, courts must look "to the nature and extent of an individual's
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. ' 63
And in doing so here the Court concluded:
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a public figure.
He played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, and his partic-
ipation related solely to his representation of a private client. He
took no part in the criminal prosecution .... Moreover, he never
discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press....
He plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public
issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome.6
The Court reversed and remanded, ordering a new trial "[b]ecause the
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and was permitted to
presume damages without proof of injury."' 65 In the new trial the New York
Times standard was inapplicable.
Powell's position in Gertz has withstood the test of time. It was the
cornerstone of the Court's most recent first amendment defamation opinion
59. Id. at 347.
60. Id. at 349.
61. Id. at 351.





WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:411
in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell." While Powell's position still leaves an
unavoidable gray area as to when a relatively little known person becomes
a "public figure" for purposes of the public controversy in which the libel
arose, the Gertz test affords substantial guidance.
THE ESTABLISI-HMENT CLAUSE
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,67
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, found unconstitutional a set of New
York statutes granting (1) financial aid to nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools for maintenance, (2) tuition grants to the impoverished
parents of students attending such schools, and (3) tax relief for "middle
income" parents of students attending such schools. All three subsidies were
held to violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Powell began by acknowledging that "it is evident from the numerous
opinions of the Court, and of Justices in concurrence and dissent in the
leading cases applying the Establishment Clause, that no 'bright line' guid-
ance is afforded. ' 68 Nevertheless, he proceeded to observe that "the con-
trolling constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and the broad
contours of our inquiry are now well defined." 6 9 He then found that the
controlling past precedents7 lay down a "now well-defined three-part test ' 7'
applicable to statutes involving both education and religion:
Taken together, these decisions dictate that to pass muster under
the Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a
clearly secular legislative purpose ... second, must have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... and, third,
must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. 72
Applying these criteria to the New York statutes, Powell found that "each
measure [was] adequately supported by legitimate, nonsectarian state inter-
ests." '73 But all three measures under scrutiny failed the second "primary
effects" test. Thus it was unnecessary to apply the third "unnecessary
entanglement" test. 74
66. 108 S.Ct. 876 (1988).
67. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
68. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5
(1973).
69. Id. at 761.
70. Id. at 770-72 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
71. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772.
72. Id. at 772-73. In later opinions this three prong test is frequently referred to as the
Lemon test. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
73. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772-73.
74. Id. at 780.
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Looking first at the maintenance grants, Powell found that
Absent appropriate restrictions on expenditures for [providing fa-
cilities in which religion is taught] and similar purposes, it simply
cannot be denied that this section has a primary effect that advances
religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities of sec-
tarian elementary and secondary schools.75
The parents' grant program failed for essentially the same reason:
In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state
aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular,
neutral, and nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that
direct aid in whatever form is invalid.
7 6
The fact that the grants were given to the parents rather than the
schools was immaterial. Citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters,77 Powell ac-
knowledged that parents have a right to choose non-public education because
of the free exercise clause of the first amendment and that a "tension
inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses.
78
But, he continued "[a]s a result of this tension, our cases require the State
to maintain an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting'
religion." '79 Thus, the fact that those who chose to "support other schools
because of the constraints of 'conscience and discipline' " also might "pay
public school taxes at the same time" could not remedy the departure from
neutrality involved by the subsidy. 0 The tax benefit for more affluent
parents was also constitutionally deficient because it was also a "form of
encouragement and reward for sending [the taxpayers'] children to non-
public schools."
' 8'
Powell rejected an analogy to the Walz v. Tax Commission of New
York City line of cases upholding state laws exempting church property
from taxation. He did so on two grounds. The first was precedent. Both
before and after adoption of the first amendment, church property was
exempt from property taxes. In contrast, "[w]e know of no historical
precedent for New York's recently promulgated tax relief program. ' 82 Also
the Walz line of cases was distinguished because the exemption of church
property from taxation "was a product not of any purpose to support or
to subsidize, but of a fiscal relationship designed to minimize involvement
and entanglement between Church and State." 3 Powell found that "the
75. Id. at 774.
76. Id. at 780.
77. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
78. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 778 (1973).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 788-89.
81. Id. at 791.
82. Id. at 792.
83. Id. at 793. The leading case upholding state laws exempting church property from
taxation is Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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New York statute, unlike the extension of an exemption, would tend to
increase rather than limit the involvement between Church and State." 84 A
second ground for distinguishing Walz was the implication for "entangle-
ment" posed by the relative breadth or narrowness of the benefited class:
The exemption challenged in Walz was not restricted to a class
composed exclusively or even predominantly of religious institutions.
Instead, the exemption covered all property devoted to religious,
educational, or charitable purposes. As the parties here must con-
cede, tax reductions authorized by this law flow primarily to the
parents of children attending sectarian, nonpublic schools. Without
intimating whether this factor alone might have controlling signifi-
cance in another context.. ., it should be apparent that in terms
of the potential divisiveness of any legislative measure the narrow-
ness of the benefited class would be an important factor.1
5
In Nyquist the Court did not have to reach the entanglement issue
because it found the New York statutes invalid under the "primary effects"
test. Thus, Powell's discussion of entanglement parameters was dicta.
In subsequent cases the entanglement test has come under severe attack
and this has threatened continued adherence to the three prong Lemon test
that Powell made the linchpin of his Nyquist analysis . 6 Consequently, in
three recent concurring opinions, Powell wrote to buttress the Lemon
principles, with particular emphasis on strengthening the under-the-gun
entanglement criterion.
In his concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree,87 Powell stated:
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to
criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. Lemon . .. identifies
standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only coherent
test a majority of the Court has ever adopted .... Lemon has not
been overruled or its test modified. Yet, continued criticism of it
could encourage other courts to feel free to decide Establishment
Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 8
Powell then noted that the Alabama moment of silent meditation statute
set aside in Wallace did not have "a clear secular purpose" and thus
84. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793.
85. Id. at 794. Powell subsequently cites Lemon's quotation of Freund that '"political
division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect."' Id. at 796 n.54 (quoting Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
82 HARv. L. Rav. 1680, 1692 (1969).
86. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67, 68-69, 79 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); 472 U.S. 38, 84, 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 472 U.S. 38, 90, 91 (White, J.,
dissenting); 472 U.S. 38, 91, 108-112 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. 472 U.S. 38, 62 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
88. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
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"failfed] the first prong of the Lemon test and therefore violate[ed] the
Establishment Clause." 89
A few weeks later, Powell delivered a concurring opinion in another
establishment clause case, Aguilar v. Felton.90 There, in an opinion by
Justice Brennan, the Court found that New York City's use of federal funds
to pay the salaries of public employees who taught special remedial courses
in parochial schools violated the establishment clause. The City had taken
special precautions to keep the program and its administration purely
secular. As Justice Brennan observed:
The professionals involved in the prograffi are directed to avoid
involvement with religious activities that are conducted within the
private schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms.
All material and equipment used in the programs funded under
Title I are supplied by the Government and are used only in those
programs. The professional personnel are solely responsible for the
selection of the students. Additionally, the professionals are in-
formed that contact with private school personnel should be kept
to a minimum. Finally, the administrators of the parochial schools
are required to clear the classrooms used by the public school
personnel of all religious symbols. 9'
Relying on Lemon, the majority found, however, that the very measures to
avoid the "program from being used, intentionally or unwittingly, to
inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding parochial school" failed
to save the program from unconstitutionality "because the supervisory
system established by the City of New York inevitably results in the excessive
entanglement of church and state."' g
Burger, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and White dissented. Rehnquist's dissent
was brief, relying on his earlier lengthy dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,93 but
he went for the jugular: "the Court takes advantage of the 'Catch 22'
paradox of its own creation ... whereby aid must be supervised to ensure
no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause an entangle-
ment."' 4 Justice O'Connor wrote at greater length in rejecting application
of the entanglement test of Lemon because she was unable to discern logical
support for it. 95 She also believed that "the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement." 
96
89. Id. at 66.
90. 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
91. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 407 (1985).
92. Id. at 409.
93. 473 U.S. 402, 420 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985)).
94. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95.Id. at 421, 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 429 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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Powell, while joining in the majority opinion, wrote a separate concur-
rence to defend the embattled entanglement test. The main thrust of his
concurrence was that "[t]his risk of entanglement is compounded by the
additional risk of political divisiveness stemming from the aid to religion at
issue here." 97 Relying upon dicta in his opinion for the Court in Nyquist,
Powell wrote:
In States such as New York that have large and varied sectarian
populations, one can be assured that politics will enter into any
state decision to aid parochial schools. Public schools, as well as
private schools, are under increasing financial pressure to meet real
and perceived needs. Thus, any proposal to extend direct govern-
mental aid to parochial schools alone is likely to spark political
disagreement from taxpayers who support the public schools, as
well as from nonrecipient sectarian groups, who may fear that
needed funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro-
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that,
as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain
a political system to the breaking point."98
But Powell did not stop there. He acknowledged the difficulty inherent
in the "paradox" or "dilemma" problem that Justice Rehnquist had em-
phasized:
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement prongs
of the Lemon test. Our decisions require governments extending aid
to parochial schools to tread an extremely narrow line between
being certain that the "principal or primary effect" of the aid is
not to advance religion, and avoiding excessive entanglement. None-
theless, the Court has never foreclosed the possibility that some
types of aid to parochial schools could be valid under the Estab-
lishment Clause. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular assis-
tance to both parochial and public school children in some areas.
E.g., [Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1938)] (tax deductions
for educational expenses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968) (provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding these types
of indirect aid to parochial schools. 99
97. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 416 (Powell, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 416-17. As noted below in the discussion of Powell's opinion in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Powell's deep concern about the
danger to democracy from the civil strife likely to flow from religiously polarized politics
parallels his views about the dangers of racially polarized politics.
99. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 418-19.
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While Powell's observation did not resolve the paradox, he attempted to
place constraints on carrying the entanglement test to its ultimate extreme.
But despite Powell's efforts, the entanglement test still poses a major
problem for predicting the ultimate result in the gray areas in establishment
clause cases.100
In his last term on the Court, Powell again concurred in an establishment
clause case. In Edwards v. Aguillard0' the Court held that Louisiana's
"Balanced Treatment for Creation Science and Evolution-Science in Public
School Instruction" Act was facially invalid under the establishment clause.
Powell, while joining in Brennan's majority opinion, wrote separately "to
emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion diminishes the traditionally
broad discretion accorded state and local school officials in the selection of
the public school curriculum."'0
Powell's opinion started by reaffirming the continuing validity of the
three prong test of Lemon reflected in his own opinion for the Court in
Nyquist. He then focused on the first prong of that test: whether the
challenged statute has a secular purpose. On its face the Act stated that its
purpose was to protect academic freedom. Powell acknowledged that this
posed a problem:
This statement is puzzling. Of course, the "academic freedom" of
teachers to present information in public schools, and students to
receive it is broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed by the Estab-
lishment Clause. "Academic freedom" does not encompass the right
of a legislature to structure the public school curriculum in order
to advance a particular religious belief .... Nevertheless, I read
this statement in the Act as rendering the purpose of the statute at
least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to review the legislative
history of the Act. 03
Powell concluded that "[my] examination of the language and the
legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent
of the Louisiana legislature was to promote a particular religious belief."
' 04
This was because it was "structuring the public school curriculum to make
it compatible with a particular religious belief: the divine creation of
man." 105 Then, citing his earlier dissent in Board of Education v. Pico,'01
Powell closed by emphasizing
100. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) ("Theoretically, of course,
the balance between the needs of the press and the individual's claim to compensation for
wrongful injury might be structured on a case-by-case basis.... But this approach would
lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to
supervise the lower courts unmanageable.").
101. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
102. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2584 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2586.
104. Id. at 2587.
105. Id. at 2588.
106. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 893 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
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"that the States and locally elected school boards should have the
responsibility for determining the educational policy of the public
schools.". . . A decision respecting the subject matter to be taught
in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply
because the material to be taught "happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions.". . . In the context of a
challenge under the Establishment Clause, interference with the
decisions of these authorities is warranted only when the purpose
for their decision is clearly religious.10 7
Without citing Justice Rehnquist's lengthy reexamination of the history
of the first amendment's establishment clause in Wallace v. Jaffree,108 which
sought to decouple Jefferson and the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty
of 1786 from the establishment clause, Powell indicated his belief in their
continuing relevance to the original intent of the Founding Fathers:
The early settlers came to this country from Europe to escape
religious persecution that took the form of forced support of state-
established churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly when
they perceived the same type of religious intolerance emerging in
this country. The reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the
Founding Fathers, is instructive. George Mason's draft of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by the House of Bur-
gesses in 1776. Because of James Madison's influence, the Decla-
ration of Rights embodied the guarantee of free exercise of religion,
as opposed to toleration. Eight years later, a provision prohibiting
the establishment of religion became a part of Virginia law when
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, written in response to a proposal that all Virginia
citizens be taxed to support the teaching of the Christian religion,
spurred the legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 770, n.28, 93 S. Ct., at 2964,
n.28. Both the guarantees of free exercise and against the establish-
ment of religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of
Rights by its drafter, James Madison.'0
Finally, Powell concluded with the observation that the establishment
clause by no means requires government to be hostile to religion, nor does
it require school boards to exclude courses on religions or religious history
or to ban religious books:
As a matter of history, school children can and should properly
be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I
107. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (citations omitted).
108. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2589.
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would see no constitutional problem if school children were taught
the nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how these
beliefs affected the attitudes of the times and the structure of our
government. Courses in comparative religion of course are custom-
ary and constitutionally appropriate. In fact, since religion permeates
our history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is
necessary to understand many historical as well as contemporary
events. In addition, it is worth noting that the Establishment Clause
does not prohibit per se the educational use of religious documents
in public school education. Although this Court has recognized that
the Bible is an "instrument of religion," . . . it also has made clear
that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study
of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like."...
The Establishment Clause is properly understood to prohibit the
use of the Bible and other religious documents in public school
education only when the purpose of the use is to advance a particular
religious belief. 10
Tm FouRTH AmENDMENT
Three of Justice Powell's more important fourth amendment opinions
are his opinions for the Court in United States v. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan"' and Oliver v. United States"2
(the "open fields" case) and his dissent in California v. Ciraolo"3 (the
"overflight" case).
Powell noted in the first opinion that "[a]s the Fourth Amendment is
not absolute in its terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic
values at stake."" 4 The issue was whether the President had constitutional
or statutory authority to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security
matters without prior judicial approval as required by the Omnibus Crime
and Safe Streets Act. Writing for the majority, Powell found neither the
statute nor the Constitution gave the President such authority because the
power would infringe upon defendants' rights under the fourth amendment.
The factors to be balanced were the Government's right to protect itself
and the individual's right to privacy. As Powell put it:
[R]esolution [of the issue requires] sensitivity both to the Govern-
ment's right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack
and to the citizen's right to be secure in his privacy against unrea-
sonable Government intrusion." 5
110. Id. at 2589-90 (citations omitted).
111. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
112. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
113. 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (PoweR, J., dissenting).
114. United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297,
314 (1972).
115. Id. at 299.
19881
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:411
Powell recognized an implied right to privacy in the fourth amendment:
We look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy. Though
physical entry of the home is the chief evil which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields
private speech from unreasonable surveillance."
6
Indeed, this implied right to privacy extends to private discussions of
political matters and thus involves first amendment as well as fourth
amendment considerations:
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence
of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of
"ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive
may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech. "Historically the struggle for free-
dom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue
of the scope of the search and seizure power.".. . History abun-
dantly documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent
and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most
fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections become
the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be
those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger
to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act
under so vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic
security.". . . The price of lawful public dissent must not be a
dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must
the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen
dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation.
For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential
to our free society."
7
Looking at the language of the Omnibus Criminal Safe Streets Act and
its legislative history, Powell found that the Act "represents a comprehensive
attempt by Congress to promote more effective control of crime while
protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression. Much of Title
III was drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic sur-
veillance enunciated by this Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)."118 Thus, Powell
found that the President 'could not evade the Act's requirement to obtain
a court order before instituting electronic surveillance in internal security
matters. However, Powell reserved the question of what constitutional
requirements must be satisfied in external security matters. Thus, once again
we see Powell's finely tuned balancing and his careful delineation of the
116. Id. at 312-13.
117. Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 302.
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scope of the precedent. We also see respect for the integrity of the courts,
a theme that runs through many of Powell's opinions. Here he says that
[w]e cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts
regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is
no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases.11 9
Powell's opinion in Oliver v. United States'2 reaffirmed the "open
fields" doctrine announced by Justice Holmes in Hester v. United States.
The doctrine provides that the explicit language of the fourth amendment
does not extend its special protections to open fields around a person's
house.' 2' But in reaffirming the open fields doctrine, Powell made clear
that the fourth amendment includes an implicit right to privacy that is
broader than the express words of the amendment.-' He quoted the second
Justice Harlan to support the argument that the amendment requires an
inquiry into whether an individual legitimately may claim under the fourth
amendment that a place "outside his house" should be free of government
intrusion not authorized by warrant1 23 According to Powell that inquiry
turns, however, not on the individual's subjective expectations, but rather
only on those expectations that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able. 24
In Powell's opinion "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy
for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately
surrounding the home."i25 Thus, even though the defendant had fenced his
fields and posted his land, the Government's trespass on his lands did not
violate the owner's fourth amendment rights. Justice Marshall, joined by
Brennan and Stevens, dissented on the ground that the fourth amendment
protects people, not places, and that giving this protection geographical
limitations such as the curtilage of a dwelling was improper.
26
The geographical and societal expectation limitations on privacy rights
discussed by Powell in Oliver troubled him later in California v. Ciraolo,
where, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, he dissented."27 In
Ciraolo the governmental intrusion was not trespass on open fields, but
aerial surveillance of the curtilage. Something more was needed in the
119. Id. at 320.
120. 466 U.S. 170 (1984); see Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
121. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
122. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Justice White, on the other hand,
disagreed in a separate concurrence: "However reasonable a landowner's expectations of
privacy may be, those expectations cannot convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect."' Id.
at 184 (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 177.
124. Id. at 179.
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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analysis. So Powell returned to the theme that constitutional safeguards
must be adapted to changing times if the spirit of these safeguards is to be
honored. Powell's dissent starts with the warning in Harlan's concurrence
in Katz v. U.S. that any decision to construe the fourth amendment as
proscribing only physical intrusions by police into private property "is, in
the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations
of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion."' 28
Powell then took the majority to task for failing to acknowledge the
qualitative difference between police surveillance and other uses made of
air space:
Members of the public use the air space for travel, business, or
pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities taking place
within residential yards. Here, police conducted an overflight at low
altitude solely for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime
within a private enclave into which they were constitutionally for-
bidden to intrude at ground level without a warrant.
29
Stated another way, Powell believed that the expectation of privacy within
the constitutionally protected enclave should bar purposeful intrusion by
government even if intrusions by others incidental to normal business or
social activities can occur there.
Tim EIGHTH AmENDMENT
One of the areas in which Justice Powell has had a major impact on
current Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence is the eighth amendment.
That amendment provides that
[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed
and cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
Justice Powell's more important eighth amendment opinions fall into
two categories-the capital punishment cases and the length of sentence
cases. The capital punishment opinions include his joint opinion with Justices
Stewart and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia, 13 0 his later opinions for the court
in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 3 Booth v. Maryland,'32 and McCleskey v. Kemp,33
and his dissent in Burger v. Kemp.134 The noncapital cases are his dissent
in Rummel v. Estelle 35 and his opinion for the Court distinguishing Rummel
128. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986); see Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
129. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224-25.
130. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
131. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
132. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
133. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
134. 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987).
135. 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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three years later in Solem v. Helm. 136 In both lines of cases one of Justice
Powell's principal contributions has been to restore the concept of "pro-
portionality" to determinations of what is cruel and unusual punishment.
THE DEATH PENALTY
Gregg v. Georgia37 is unusual in that the plurality opinion, announcing
the judgment, was written jointly by three Justices: Stewart, Powell and
Stevens. The case is one of the most important decisions involving capital
punishment and the eighth amendment in the past quarter-century. It
involved the validity of the statutory scheme for imposition of capital
sentences that the Georgia legislature enacted in the wake of the Court's
ruling in Furman v. Georgia,138 which had held that Georgia's old capital
sentencing system was unconstitutional. In Gregg the Court upheld Georgia's
new capital sentencing system but was divided on the rationale for the
result.
The Court was split three ways. Justices Brennan and Marshall adhered
to their view that what is "cruel and unusual punishment" evolves with the
times and that under that criterion, the death penalty can no longer be
justified in any circumstance. 3 9 Justice Stewart, Powell, and Stevens likewise
viewed the concept as an evolving one, but they concluded that "the
punishment of death does not invariably violate the constitution."'' 40 They
focused instead on the procedures by which capital punishment was imposed.
While in their view the old Georgia system permitted unguided jurors to
impose "the death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish,"'
' 41
the new Georgia system provided significant guidance to the jury and the
appellate review process added an additional safeguard against abuse:
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sen-
tencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the proportionality
review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be
sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.
142
Justice White, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment in a separate opinion that avoided any discussion of evolving
social standards and placed principal emphasis on the role of the Georgia
Supreme Court in appellate review:
Indeed, if the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task
assigned to it under the Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed
136. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
137. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
138. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
139. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976), (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 169.
141. Id. at 206.
142. Id.
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for discriminatory reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any given
category of crime will be set aside. Petitioner has wholly failed to
establish ... that the Georgia Supreme Court failed to properly
perform its task in this case or that it is incapable of performing
its task adequately in all cases; and this Court should not assume
that it did not do so.'
43
The joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens is of interest
not only because of the seminal quality of Gregg v. Georgia, but also for
the insight it affords into Powell's subsequent eighth amendment opinions.
In particular, its heavy reliance upon Weems, Trop and Robinson'" clearly
foreshadowed Powell's subsequent insistence that the eighth amendment's
requirements of proportionality apply to all sentences, those in noncapital
as well as capital cases.1
45
In Eddings v. Oklahoma Powell, writing for the Court, set aside a
death sentence imposed upon a defendant who was only sixteen years old,
emotionally disturbed, and mentally retarded at the time he committed the
murder. The Court did so because the sentencing judge "did not evaluate
the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact" but
"rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider
the evidence."' The Court reversed, noting that "this sentence was imposed
without 'the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors ...
required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.' "147
As in many of Powell's opinions in this field, the Court was closely divided.
Four Justices, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and
Rehnquist, dissented.
In Eddings Powell traced the recent history of the Court's evolving
views on the constitutional limitations imposed on capital punishment:
As THE CHImF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is the
product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to
develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and
principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the
individual....
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide
standards for a constitutional death penalty that would serve both
143. Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
144. See id. at 171-174 (discussing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). All of these cases
involved non capital sentences or offenses.
145. Justice Powell's subsequent non capital sentence opinions in Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), and in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), are
discussed below.
146. 455 U.S. 104, 113 (1982) (emphasis in original).
147. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 606 (1978)).
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goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the ac-
cused. 4
8
Turning to the facts, Powell wrote:
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon the
mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett.
Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from
considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse
to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.
In this instance, it was as if the trial judge had instructed a jury
to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf.
The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But
they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from
their consideration.
149
Powell again showed special solicitude for juvenile offenders in his
dissent in Burger v. Kemp. s0 There he emphasized the special problems
presented when the defendant sentenced to death was age seventeen and
obviously mentally retarded:
Imposing the death penalty on an individual who is not yet
legally an adult is unusual and raises special concern. At least,
where a State permits the execution of a minor, great care must be
taken to ensure that the minor truly deserves to be treated as an
adult. A specific inquiry including "age, actual maturity, family
environment, education, emotional and mental stability, and ...
prior record" is particularly relevant when a minor's criminal cul-
pability is at issue.'
In McCleskey v. Kemp Powell adhered to his belief that the appropri-
ateness or inappropriateness of imposition of the death penalty should be
objectively determined in light of facts directly related to the individual's
character, conduct, and the circumstances regarding his crime. In this case
the jury found two aggravating circumstances justifying imposition of the
death penalty and the defendant offered no mitigating evidence. The lower
court, on the recommendation of the jury, imposed the death sentence.
Subsequently, the defendant sought to have the sentence set aside in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His counsel presented a statistical
study that purported to show that "racial considerations ... influence
capital sentencing decisions in Georgia based on the race of the murder
victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant."'1 52 Speaking for
148. Id. at 110-11.
149. Id. at 113-14 (1980).
150. 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
151. Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3140-41 (1987).
152. 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1759 (1987).
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himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia,
Powell rejected arguments that imposition of the death penalty on Mc-
Cleskey violated the eighth amendment and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
Several comments on this opinion are in order. From the perspective
of the court and its continuing deep division over the constitutionality of
the death penalty under the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the opinion
is yet one more precedent in the controlling line of decisions following in
the wake of Furman v. Georgia153 and Gregg v. Georgia.154 Thus, Powell's
opinion reaffirmed for himself and four .other justices that as long as
Georgia in fact provides for procedures in the capital sentencing process
that ensure that the discretion unavoidably involved in sentencing is "con-
trolled by clear and objective standards as to produce non-discriminatory
application,"'5 5 the system itself is constitutional. Powell summarized this
requirement as follows:
In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a constitu-
tionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death pen-
alty. First, there is a required threshold below which the death
penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, the State must establish
rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to
whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the
threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus that the death penalty is
disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from
imposing the death penalty for that offense. Second, States cannot
limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that
could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect, the
State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it
to consider any relevant information offered by the defendant.
5 6
Powell concluded that "[i]n light of our precedents under the Eighth
Amendment, McCleskey cannot argue successfully that his sentence is 'dis-
proportionate to the crime in the traditional sense.' "157
One of the more interesting parts of Powell's opinion in McCleskey is
his treatment of the statistical study and its relationship to both the eighth
amendment and equal protection arguments advanced by the defendant.
Since the statistical study was used by the defendant as the basis for two
alternative constitutional arguments, Powell chose to discuss the study's
implications for each constitutional provision separately.
Addressing the eighth amendment argument that the imposition of the
death penalty on McCleskey "is disproportionate to the sentences in other
153. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
154. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
155. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1772 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 198 (1975)).
156. Id. at 1774.
157. Id.
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murder cases," Powell said that "absent a showing that the Georgia capital
punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, Mc-
Cleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other
defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death pen-
alty."'5 The Court's earlier opinion in Gregg favored such an argument
because it recognized that "opportunities for discretionary leniency" would
produce disparate results in individual application. But Powell rejected that
extension of Gregg. As long as the sentencing procedures "focus discretion
'on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the individual defen-
dant,' . . we lawfully may presume that McCleskey's death sentence was
not 'wantonly and freakishly imposed,' . . . and thus that the sentence is
not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth
Amendment." 5 9
Having disposed of the facial attack on the Georgia statute, Powell
then proceeded to deal with the defendant's argument that "the Georgia
capital punishment system is arbitrary and capricious in application, and
therefore his sentence is excessive, because racial considerations may influ-
ence capital sentencing decisions in Georgia."'16 Powell recognized that the
statistical study was relevant but, in his view, it was not constitutionally
determinative for two reasons. The first was the inherent probative weakness
of statistical evidence generally:
To evaluate McCleskey's challenge, we must examine exactly
what the Baldus study may show. Even Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove that race enters into any capital
sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's
particular case. Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that
a particular factor entered into some decisions. There is, of course,
some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a
criminal case. There are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice
will influence other criminal trials .... The question "is at what
point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable". . . . Mc-
Cleskey asks us to accept the likelihood allegedly shown by the
Baldus study as the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk
of racial prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions. This we
decline to do.
... Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained
is invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial
bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our
criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to
criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not dem-
158. Id..
159. Id. at 1775.
160. Id.
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onstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting
the Georgia capital-sentencing process.
161
Powell's second reason for rejecting the study was the lack of any
limiting principle should such studies generally become criteria for finding
constitutionally impermissible discrimination against minority groups:
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal
justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application
to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties .... Thus, if we
accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted
the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his
sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be
extended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that
correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to
gender. Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his
victim, other claims could apply with equally logical force to sta-
tistical disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors
in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys, or judges.
Also, there is no logical reason that such a claim need be limited
to racial or sexual bias. 162
161. Id. at 1775, 1778.
162. Id. at 1779-80. Powell's wariness of statistical studies is also evident in other contexts.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 778, 787-
88 (1973) ("Quite apart from the language of the statute, our cases make clear that a mere
statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will not be used to finance
religious education. Our cases, however, have long since foreclosed the notion that mere
statistical assurances will suffice to sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of 'effect' and
'entanglement' [in Establishment Clause, First Amendment cases]."); see also San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 27 (1973); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
346 (1976) ("Bare statistics rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decision-
making process.").
At the American Bar Association's Annual Meeting in Toronto in August 1988, proponents
of a resolution that would have endorsed federal and state legislation creating a statutory
presumption of unconstitutional discrimination based on race when "there is a valid showing
of a substantial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty which is statistically explicable
only by reference to the races of either victims or defendants" cited McCleskey as supporting
or condoning such legislation. ABA House of Delegates, Meeting August 1988, Toronto,
Canada, Report of the General Practice, Criminal Justice and Individual Rights and Respon-
sibilities Sections, Accompanying Proposed Resolution 109, pages 5-6. But a careful reading
of Powell's McCleskey opinion, and his other opinions dealing with statistical studies cited in
this article, dispels that notion. Powell's remarks in McCleskey about presentation to the
legislatures of such statistical studies, 107 S. Ct. at 1781, went to the issue of whether or not
legislatures should abolish the death penalty for all individuals in a multiracial society.
Legislation creating a two-tiered capital sentencing system where the maximum sentence that
could be imposed would in fact be dependent upon the race, religion or sex of the convicted
criminal or his victim would be totally inconsistent with Justice Powell's philosophy of
individualized justice and his fears of the effects of racially or religiously polarized politics.
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In Booth v. Maryland, writing for the Court, Powell set aside a
Maryland statute that permitted evidence of the impact of a murder on the
family of the victim to be presented to a jury determining whether or not
imposition of the death penalty was appropriate. He wrote:
One can understand the grief and anger of the family caused
by the brutal murders in this case, and there is no doubt that jurors
generally are aware of these feelings. But the formal presentation
of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than
to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case [the sentence]
on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant.
As we have noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must
"be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."... The admission of these emotionally-charged opinions
as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence
clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we require
in capital cases.
63
This last term in Thompson v. Oklahoma'6 a plurality of the Court,
Stevens joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, held that the eighth
amendment barred imposition of the death penalty on any person less than
16 years old at the time of commission of the crime. Justice O'Connor
concurred only in the result.16s She did not find the evidence available to
the Court sufficient to support a finding that there was a national consensus
forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the
age of 16, though she thought such a consensus might exist. But she said
that the sentence must be set aside nevertheless since the state statute at
issue did not specify a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, dis-
sented. 66 Justice Kennedy abstained. Both the plurality and dissenting
opinions cited different Powell opinions in support of their contradictory
conclusions. For example, Stevens wrote:
Justice Powell has repeatedly reminded us of the importance of
"the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law,
recognizing that there are differences which must be accommodated
in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with
those of adults. Examples of this distinction abound in our law: in
contracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedure, in criminal
sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and to hold
See supra text accompanying notes 97-98; infra note 284. Such legislation also would be
unconstitutional under the logic of Powell's eighth and fourteenth amendment opinions for
the Court discussed in this article.
163. 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 (1987).
164. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
165. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 2711.
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office." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
6 7
And Scalia cited Powell in rebuttal:
Because I think the views of this Court on the policy questions
discussed in Part V of the plurality opinion to be irrelevant, I make
no attempt to refute them. It suffices to say that there is another
point of view, suggested in the following passage written by our
esteemed former colleague Justice Powell, whose views the plurality
several times invokes for support, ante, at 5, 16:
"Minors who become embroiled with the law range from the
very young up to those on the brink of majority. Some of the older
minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened criminals, deserving no
greater consideration than that properly accorded [*94] all persons
suspected of crime." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734, n.4
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The view that it is possible for a 15-year-old to come within
this category uncontestably prevailed when the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments were adopted, and, judging from the actions
of the society's democratically elected representatives, still persuades
a substantial segment of the people whose "evolving standards of
decency" we have been appointed to discern rather than decree. 6
One can, of course, only speculate as to how Powell might have acted
in this particular case had he still been on the Court. But in speculating,
we may gain a clearer insight into Powell's judicial philosophy. Based on
the facts of this case, I believe it is unlikely that Powell would have joined
the dissenters. Whether he would have joined the plurality opinion or
concurred in the result on other grounds is a much closer question.
A surmise that Powell would have joined in the plurality opinion can
be supported by two points. First, Powell clearly believes that the contours
of what is cruel and unusual punishment for eighth amendment purposes
must reflect not only all the protections the Founding Fathers would have
accorded a defendant under that concept, but also additional protections
that changing social and moral values of our contemporary society, however
measured, would also afford. Second, Powell in note 5 in his Burger v.
Kemp dissent cites the positions of the American Law Institute, the American
Bar Association and "[all] European countries" as opposing imposition of
the death penalty on youthful defendants. 69 The plurality opinion in Thomp-
son paraphrases Powell in citing these same authorities as additional support
for the finding of a national consensus against its imposition on persons
under 16.170
167. Id. at 2692.
168. Id. at 2719.
169. 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3141 (1987).
170. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2696.
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On the other hand, an argument can also be made that when given a
choice between overruling a State action under a procedural or substantive
constitutional standard, Powell's notions of judicial restraint make him far
more comfortable in the procedural realm. This was the approach he
followed in Gregg. He also chose the procedural route in his majority
opinion in Eddings and his dissent in Burger. Thus under his reasoning in
these cases, perhaps a state may permit execution of some persons under
16 years of age under extraordinary circumstances. But if so, the legislature
must specifically authorize it, as Justice O'Connor held, and in addition,
as Powell's Burger dissent indicates, the statutory scheme also must require
consideration of youth as one of several mitigating factors including "age,
actual maturity, family environment, education, emotional and mental sta-
bility, and ... prior record.' 7' From this perspective, the Oklahoma statute
in Thompson, like the broader Georgia statute in Furman, was procedurally
deficient. 72 Whether Powell would have rested on that ground or gone
ahead to join the eight justices in grappling with the harder substantive
question can of course never be answered. But one suspects that had Powell
been confronted with these alternatives, he would have taken a procedural
route. Yet the dynamics of personal interactions in the conference and
afterwards as draft opinions are circulated create imponderables that cannot
be factored into speculative answers to such "what might have been"
questions.
LENGTH OF SENTENCES
Powell's noncapital case opinions, his dissent in Rummel v. Estelle'"
and his opinion for the court three years later in Solem v. Helm,174 provide
yet another example of how Powell ultimately persuaded a majority of his
colleagues to come around to his view on a major constitutional issue. In
this instance Justice Stewart, who concurred in Rummel, had left the court
and been replaced by Justice O'Connor who dissented in Solem. Thus the
decisive vote in Solem came from Justice Blackmun who had been with the
majority in Rummel but shifted to join Powell in Solem.
The issue in both Rummel and Solem was whether, based on the
principle of proportionality, the eighth amendment imposes any limitations
171. Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3141 (1987).
172. In Thompson, there was also a second procedural route to reversal of the sentence.
It was a due process issue. Highly inflamatory photographs of the corpse of the victim were
permitted to be considered in the sentencing process. This issue was raised by the defendant
but it was not reached by the majority since the Court reversed on the eighth amendment
argument. Scalia addressed it in his dissent. He found that "if there is a point at which
inflammatoriness so plainly exceeds evidentiary worth as to violate the federal Constitution, it
has not been reached here." 108 S. Ct. at 2722. Powell's opinion for the Court in Booth
clearly indicates that such points do exist, and in Booth they were exceeded. One can only
speculate that Powell and at least some of the Justices not joining in Scalia's dissent might
have found such an exceedence here.
173. 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
174. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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on the length of sentences legislatures may establish for noncapital offenses.
Powell's careful research into the English law roots of the amendment
provided the key. He went back to the Magna Carta and its provisions on
amercements to find the origins of the concept of proportionality and traced
its descent through the English Bill of Rights of 1689 to the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, which was the immediate source of the language in
the eighth amendment.
In light of this history, Powell could have rested his result on the
concept of "original intent." But he chose to take a more expansive
approach. Evoking the "living Constitution," 175 Powell tied the proportion-
ality cases into the Furman v. Georgia176 and Gregg v. Georgia'" line of
cases which had read limitations on death penalties into the eighth amend-
ment to reflect changing social values. Powell stated in his Rummel dissent
that "[t]he special relevance of Furman to this case lies in the general
acceptance by Members of the Court of two basic principles. First, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly excessive punishment. Second, the
scope of the Eighth Amendment is to be measured by 'evolving standards
of decency.' "178
In his Rummel dissent, Powell also rebutted the argument that the
Court's review of the scope of permissible punishment set by state legisla-
tures is counter to the principles of separation of powers and federalism.
He cited a line of Fourth Circuit cases imposing proportional constraints
on sentences imposed under state law as "impressive empirical evidence that
the federal courts are capable of applying the Eighth Amendment to
disproportionate noncapital sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to
principles of federalism and state autonomy.'
79
Thus, once more we see the pragmatic Powell refusing to let abstract
principles triumph over according justice to the individual standing before
the Court:
The sentence imposed upon the petitioner would be viewed as grossly
unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer. In my view, objective
criteria clearly establish that a mandatory life sentence for defraud-
ing persons of about $230 crosses any rationally drawn line sepa-
rating punishment that lawfully may be imposed from that which
is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.8 0
In Solem, for his new found majority, Powell answered the arguments
that applying federal scrutiny to sentences to see if they are consistent with
the concept of proportionality will allow the courts virtually unfettered
discretion and deluge the courts with a flood of new cases. He reached
175. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 307 (1980).
176. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
177. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
178. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 291-92.
179. Id. at 306.
180. Id. at 307.
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back to Weems v. United States 1 8 and the few subsequent cases in that
line, such as Trop v. Dulles8 2 and Robinson v. California,'3 and to the
death penalty cases to find objective factors by which proportionality may
be determined:
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions.1
4
Powell emphasized that application of such standards by courts is
practical. "Application of the factors that we identify also assumes that
courts are able to compare different sentences .... Decisions of this kind,
although troubling, are not unique to this area. The courts are constantly
called upon to draw similar lines in a variety of contexts."'18 5 Powell then
proceeded to apply the criteria to the facts before him and concluded:
Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the
penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who
have committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more
harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the
possible exception of a single State. We conclude that his sentence
is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore pro-
hibited by the Eighth Amendment.1
6
Justice Powell has made a major contribution by bringing new life to
the almost moribund eighth amendment. Looking back into history to
ascertain the evils that the founding fathers and their English forebears
sought to avoid, Powell has made the eighth amendment's protections
relevant to contemporary society.
Justice Powell's contribution to current eighth amendment jurisprudence
may have broader influence in the future in areas outside criminal sentenc-
ing. Commentators have already noted the relevance of the concept of
proportionality to awards of punitive damages.' 8 7 Its applicability to such
181. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
182. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
183. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
184. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
185. Id. at 294.
186. Id. at 303.
187. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. Rav.
139 (1986); Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from
History, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1233 (1987) (which unfortunately fails to acknowledge Jeffries'
earlier work); Note, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework
for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALi. L. REv. 1432 (1987); Note, The Constitutionality of
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damages was one of the issues before the Court in Bankers Life and
Casualty Company v. Crenshaw.8 " But the Court did not reach the issue
since it had not been raised below. Moreover, the Court subsequently denied
certiorari in two California cases which rejected arguments that eighth
amendment limitations and due process procedural requirements were vio-
lated by punitive damages awards. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy would
have granted cert. 189 The Supreme Court of Georgia meanwhile reached and
Punitive Damages under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MicH. L.
REv. 1699 (1987). See also Freeman, Tort Law Reform: Superfund/RCRA Liability as a Major
Cause of the Insurance Crisis, 21 ToRT & INS. L.J. 517 (1986); Freeman, Inappropriate and
Unconstitutional Retroactive Application of Superfund Liability, 42 Bus. LAw. 215 (1986).
188. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988). In a concurring opinion Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Scalia, observed that the "wholly standardless discretion [of the jury] to determine the severity
of punishment appears inconsistent with due process." 108 S.Ct. 1645, 1656 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). This due process "vagueness" argument is closely related to the proportionality
concept in the eighth amendment and the equal protection clause. Absent appropriate guidance
as to when and in what amounts punitive damages may be awarded, it is inevitable that some
awards will be "wantonly and freakishly" imposed. Such awards will not only be "dispro-
portional," they will also violate equal protection standards. Thus, the basic thrust of Powell's
opinions for the Court in the death penalty cases discussed above, while technically dealing
with the cruel and unusual punishments clause and equal protection, supports the same result
reached through a "vagueness" analysis. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1772
(1987) (as long as Georgia in fact provides for procedures that ensure that discretion unavoidably
involved in sentencing is "controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-
discriminatory application," the system is constitutional.) Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
111 (1982) ("Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a
constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent application
and fairness to the accused.") There is nothing in Powell's logic or language in these cases
that limits application of the principles and procedures discussed to the protection of life but
not of liberty and property. Indeed, as noted earlier, Powell purposefully relied on the death
penalty cases to extend the requirement of proportionality to the protection of liberty.
Moreover, Powell has championed procedural constraints in other contexts to preclude abuses
that rise to constitutional dimensions. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)
("We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers
and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In most
jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that
they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm cause. And they remain free to use
their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views.")
189. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Downeys Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Calif. Ct. App., 2d Dist.,
234 Cal. Rprt. 835, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072 (Cal. App. 1987), cert. denied 108 S.Ct. 2023
(1988); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Nielsen, rev. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3814, 3818 (May 31, 1988).
These California courts and other lower courts have cited Powell's opinion for the Court
in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), as support for the proposition that the eighth
amendment does not apply to punitive damages because they are awarded in civil rather than
criminal proceedings. But that reliance is misplaced. While Ingraham adhered to the traditional
"criminal v. civil" focus of prior cruel and unusual punishment clause cases in deciding that
clause did not apply to the paddling of school children, and contains dicta that lends support
to that conclusion, it did not hold that the clause could never be applied to civil sanctions.
Indeed, it expressly reserved the issue. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37. Thus Powell's
subsequent approach to the excessive fines clause in Rummel and Solem, with his reliance on
the Magna Carta's limitations on amercements and Lord Devon's Case, both of which support
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decided the issue in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown.'90 Relying on Powell's
amercements analysis in Solem and the Jeffries' article, 19' the Georgia Court
held that the excessive fines provision of the eighth amendment, and its
Georgia Constitution equivalent, barred all excessive monetary penalties,
including punitive damages. 9' The concept of proportionality already has
been held applicable by lower courts to forfeitures under civil RICO'.
193
Moreover, the concept of proportionality, whether applied under the eighth
amendment or under the broader concept of due process, may also ultimately
operate as an outer bound on the government's imposition of other civil
penalties. They are irrefutably punishment for prohibited conduct. The
legislative label put upon them cannot mask that reality and should not be
able to lessen the constitutional safeguards afforded citizens when the
government sets out to punish them. Finally, the concept may be relevant
to the application of strict, joint and several liability under statutes like the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,-
where on the facts of a particular case the liability imposed is so dispro-
portionate to the conduct or contribution of the particular defendant as to
be punitive in effect. 95
imposition of proportionality constraints on civil as well as criminal fines, should not be
misunderstood as a fundamental shift of position on Powell's part. Powell used the same
general approach in all three opinions. He looked back into history to see what rights the
founding fathers sought to protect by the clause at issue and then at what contemporary
evolving notions of decency dictate. It must be admitted, however, that in looking at the
history of the excessive fines clause Powell gained new insights into the seminal quality of
cases like Weems and Trop and that there is a decided difference in the general tone of
Ingraham and Solem. Had Powell written Ingraham after Solem, one suspects that while the
result would be the same, he would have written it differently. In any event, if Powell were
to decide if the eighth amendment's proportionality requirement applies to punitive damages,
I believe he would hold that it does. This is because the history of the excessive fines clause,
which Powell marshalled in Rummel and Solem, is persuasive that at the time of adoption of
the eighth amendment it was intended to apply to civil as well as criminal fines. Also, even
if history were not determinative, as we have seen in the contexts of other opinions discussed
in this article, Powell is loath to permit labels to defeat the basic purpose and spirit of a
constitutional safeguard. Finally, any doubt is dispelled when Powell's subsequent dictum in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1779 ("The Eighth Amendment is not limited in
application to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties") is read in light of his earlier
observation in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), that punitive damages
"are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence."
190. 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827 (1988), appeal denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3228 (Oct. 3, 1988)
(No. 87-2007).
191. See supra note 187.
192. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. at 126-27, 365 S.E.2d at 831.
193. United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Littlefield,
821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987); Hall
v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1987, cf. United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d
1235 (7th Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1982) ("CERCLA" or the "Superfund Act").
195. When disproportionate liability is imposed retroactively, it violates yet another
fundamental principle of Anglo-American law-the principle against retroactive legislation.
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THE TENTH AMENDMENT
The tenth amendment provides that:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.
Over the course of time this amendment has had extreme ups and
downs as a constraint on Congress' exercise of the commerce power. During
Powell's tenure on the Court, it fleetingly appeared to have life after
National League of Cities v. Usery, 196 only to be relegated to useless platitude
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.1 97 In the interval
between the two decisions, Powell wrote two opinions that are among his
more revealing decisions. They are his opinion in Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi,'"8 concurring and dissenting, and his dissent in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming. 199 In both opi-
nions we see Powell's strong commitment to the principle of federalism,
which appears again and again in his eleventh and fourteenth amendment
opinions and those dealing with implied rights of action and abstention.
FERC v. Mississippi addressed Congress' use of the commerce clause
power to enact a law imposing federal procedural requirements on state
administrative bodies regulating electric and gas public utilities. In what is
sometimes referred to as "selective preemption," Congress left the state
regulatory systems in place but imposed its own policy notions in selected
areas of substantive and procedural law. Powell objected to the process.
The gist of his objection was that in prescribing "the procedures by which
state regulatory bodies make their decisions . . . for the first time, [Congress
broke] with this long standing deference to principles of federalism. ' 20 He
rejected the majority's reasoning that "Congress can condition the utility
regulatory activities ... on any term it pleases since, under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the power to pre-empt completely all such activi-
ties .... Under this 'threat of pre-emption' reasoning, Congress ... could
reduce the States to federal provinces. '20' Powell concluded that " '[t]he
The resulting effect can be doubly "harsh and oppressive." See Freeman, supra note 187; cf.
Jeffries, supra note 187; Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86
(3d Cir. 1988). But see United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). The
disproportionality issue was presented to the court in an appeal from the imposition of joint
and several liability under CERCLA. The court assumed, however, that the effects of the
judgment on appellants could be moderated by subsequent actions for contribution. It accord-
ingly treated the constitutional arguments as a facial attack on the statute, which it rejected.
It was silent on the "as applied" constitutional arguments and thus did not discuss "propor-
tionality" under either the eighth amendment or due process.
196. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), rev'd, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
197. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
198. 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
200. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 772 (1982).
201. Id. at 773.
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general rule, bottomed deeply in the belief in the importance of state control
of state judicial procedure, is that the federal law takes the state courts as
it finds them. I believe the same principle must apply to other organs of
state government.' "m
A year later in EEOC v. Wyoming Powell again dissented. Powell's
penchant for history again came to the fore: "I join the Chief Justice's
dissenting opinion, but write separately to record a personal dissent from
Justice Stevens' novel view of our Nation's history. ' 20 3 Powell took issue
with Justice Stevens' statement that " 'this Court has construed the Com-
merce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers ... to confer a power
on the National Government adequate to discharge its central mission. " 204
Powell stated that he wrote "to place the Commerce Clause in proper
historical perspective, and further to suggest that even today federalism is
not ... utterly subservient to [the Commerce] Clause." 25 Powell then
reasoned that "[tihe Constitution's central purpose was ... to constitute a
government. ' '206 He pointed out that "the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal
from which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the framework
of the National Government without even mentioning the power to regulate
commerce." 2°7 Powell observed that nothing in the text of the Constitution
gives the commerce clause supremacy over other enumerated powers. He
referred to Madison's statement in The Federalist that " '[t]he powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the
people; and the internal order, improvement and property of the State.' "208
Powell concluded that state sovereignty always has been a basic as-
sumption of American political theory:
Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state sov-
ereignty remains a fundamental component of our system that this
court has recognized time and time again .... In sum, all of the
evidence reminds us of the importance of the principles of federalism
in our constitutional system. The Founding Fathers, and those who
participated in the earliest phases of constitutional development,
understood the States' reserved powers to be a limitation on the




202. Id. at 774 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLuM.
L. REv. 489, 508 (1954)).
203. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 265 (1983).
204. Id. at 265 (quoting Justice Stevens, id. at 246-47).
205. Id. at 266.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 266-67.
208. Id. at 271 (quoting The Federalist No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
209. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 273-75.
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THm ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The eleventh amendment provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The eleventh amendment was enacted shortly after the Supreme Court held
in Chisholm v. Georgia210 that article III, section 2 of the Constitution
permitted the Court to assume original jurisdiction in a suit brought by a
citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia.
Three of Justice Powell's most significant opinions dealing with the
eleventh amendment are those he wrote for the court in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman2l' and Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon212 and his plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and O'Connor, in Welch v. State Department of Highways
and Public Transportation.213
In Pennhurst Powell stated that "[t]he Amendment's language overruled
the particular result in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its
greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of
sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Article III. ' ' 214
Since the recent case law in this area had been closely divided, Powell
carefully examined these precedents. He again found the touchstone was
"federalism." Applying that principle to the facts of Pennhurst, he con-
cluded:
A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis
of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate
the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult
to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a
federal court instructs state officials on' how to conform their
conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the
principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. 2 5
The following year in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, Powell
further developed his Pennhurst views. For the Court, he refused to find
that Congress in the Rehabilitation Act intended to waive the states'
sovereign immunity from suit:
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of
expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the States'
210. 2 U.S. 440 (1793).
211. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
212. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
213. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
214. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).
215. Id. at 106.
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Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State of California
specifically waived its immunity to suit in federal court.
216
He rejected Justice Brennan's statement that: "[i]f the Court's Eleventh
Amendment doctrine were grounded on principles essential to the structure
of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished constitutional
liberties of our people, the doctrine might be unobjectionable.... 217
Powell found instead that sovereign immunity is part of that essential
structure:
The "constitutionally mandated balance of power" between the
States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to
ensure the protection of "our fundamental liberties.". . . By guar-
anteeing the sovereign immunity of the States against suit in federal
court, the Eleventh Amendment serves to maintain this balance.2 8
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Welch v. State Department
of Highways and Public Transportation reaffirmed that the principle of
federalism requires that any Congressional intent to waive a state's sovereign
immunity "must be expressed in unmistakably clear language." 219 Accord-
ingly, for the majority he reversed Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Department20 where "It]he Court mistakenly relied
on cases holding that general language in the Safety Appliance Act ... and
the Railway Labor Act ... made those statutes applicable to the States."'' 2
Responding to Justice Brennan's dissent, Powell quoted Marshall, Hamilton,
and Madison for the proposition that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution the founding fathers did not intend an individual to be able
to sue a state in the federal courts.
FEDERAL ABSTENTION
Powell's opinion in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,m with its strong reliance
on Younger v. Harris,"2 is consistent with his views'on federalism reflected
in his tenth and eleventh amendment opinions.
The issue in Pennzoil was "whether a federal district court lawfully
may enjoin a plaintiff who has prevailed in a trial in state court from
executing the judgment in its favor pending appeal of that judgment to a
state appellate court."' 4 The case arose in the wake of Texaco's acquisition
216. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985).
217. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 242 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572
(1985)).
219. Welch v. State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2948 (1987).
220. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
221. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2947.
222. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987).
223. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
224. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1522 (1987).
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of Getty Oil and Pennzoil's subsequent suit in the Texas court alleging that
Texaco had tortiously induced Getty to breach an agreement to sell its
shares to Pennzoil. A Texas jury awarded Pennzoil actual damages of $7.53
billion and punitive damages of $3 billion. Under Texas law Pennzoil could
have obtained writs seizing Texaco's Texas assets unless Texaco posted a
bond estimated at $13 billion. As a matter of trial strategy, Texaco did not
challenge the Texas bond requirements as conflicting with federal law in
the Texas court, but rather filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, where Texaco's headquarters were
located. Pennzoil moved to dismiss the action on several grounds, including
the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris. The district court rejected
Pennzoil's arguments and the Second Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that:
The courts below should have abstained under the principles of
federalism enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to recognize
the significant interests harmed by their unprecedented intrusion
into the Texas judicial system. Similarly, neither of those courts
applied the appropriate standard in determining whether adequate
relief was available in the Texas courts.22
Powell cited the admonition in Younger that " 'courts of equity should not
act . . . when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law.' "226 But
he placed principal emphasis on Justice Black's classic definition of "our
federalism" in Younger, quoting in the Pennzoil opinion Black's language:
"This underlying reason . .. is reinforced by an even more vital
consideration, the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for
state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a contin-
uance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways .... The concept does not mean
blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it means central-
ization of control over every important issue in our National Gov-
ernment and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." ' 7
225. Id. at 1525.
226. Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971)).
227. Id. at 1525-26 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
PO WELL'S OPINIONS
Powell then extended the Younger doctrine from state criminal pro-
ceedings to state civil proceedings. This extension was not across the board,
however. It applies only "if the State's interests in the proceeding are so
important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the
comity between the States and the National Government." 2 8 Powell found
such an interest in this case. He looked to Juidice v. Vail,229 which held
that a federal court should have abstained from deciding a challenge to a
state's contempt process. Powell observed that Juidice
rests on the importance to the States of enforcing the orders and
judgments of the courts. There is little difference between the State's
interest in forcing persons to transfer property in response to a
court's judgment and in forcing persons to respond to the court's
process on pain of contempt.2 0
Finally, Texaco argued that abstention was inappropriate because no
Texas court could have heard Texaco's federal constitutional claims within
the limited time available to Texaco to avoid bankruptcy. Powell made
short shrift of this argument because Texaco never tried to get such relief
in the Texas courts. Powell said "denigrations of the procedural protections
afforded by Texas law hardly come from Texaco with good grace, as it
apparently made no effort under Texas law to secure the relief sought in
this case." 2 1 Thus, the rule handed down was that when a "litigant has
not attempted to present federal claims in related state court proceedings,
[a] federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate
remedy, in absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary. "232 In Pow-
ell's view, the fact that after the Supreme Court's decision the possible
Texas remedies were foreclosed did not matter. "[W]e have addressed the
situation that existed on the morning of December 10, 1985, when this case
was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York."2 13 Texaco gambled and lost. Thus, it could not "escape Younger
abstention by falling to assert its state remedies in a timely manner.
23 4
IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION AND "FEDERAL COMMON LAW"
Powell's important opinions on implied rights of action include his
dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago23 and his opinion for the Court
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Asso-
ciation.26
228. Id. at 1526.
229. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
230. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1527.
231. Id. at 1528.
232. Id. at 1528.
233. Id. at 1529.
234. Id. at 1521.
235. 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
236. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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Traditionally, the federal courts were reluctant to create a cause of
action where none was provided expressly by statute.237 These innovations
were not rejected as bad policy, but as decisions that only Congress could
make. But in the 1960's, the Court was induced to depart briefly from this
principle by finding implied private rights of action under federal statutes
that did not provide expressly for such enforcement. A key decision in this
new line of cases was J.L Case Co. v. Borak,2s which seemed to indicate
that the federal courts were empowered to create a private right of action
whenever it seemed wise or necessary. Borak was followed some years later
by Cort v. Ash, 239 where the Court identified legislative intent as only one
of several factors to be considered in determining whether an implied right
of action existed under a federal statute.
The beginning of the end of this kind of federal judicial policymaking
was signalled in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University
of Chicago. There the issue before the Court was whether there was an
implied right of action under Title IX of the education amendments au-
thorizing a woman to sue two universities on the ground that she was
denied admission to their medical schools because of her sex. Applying the
reasoning in Cort v. Ash, the Court found such a right. 241 Powell in his
dissent stated: "[Mlounting evidence from the courts below suggests ...
the mode of analysis we have applied in the recent past cannot be squared
with the doctrine of separation of powers. The time has come to reappraise




Powell then analyzed the long line of implied private causes of action
cases starting with Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby.23 He zeroed in
on Cort v. Ash: "It was against this background of almost invariable refusal
to imply private actions, absent a complete failure of alternative enforcement
mechanisms and a clear expression of legislative intent to create such a
remedy, that Cort v. Ash . . . was decided." 244 Powell pointed out that the
practical result violated the separation of powers principle because it
allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested
by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch. It also invites Congress
to avoid resolution of the often controversial question whether a
237. See, e.g., United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) (refusing to create cause of
action on behalf of United States against employee whose negligence resulted in government
liability under Federal Tort Claims Act); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301
(1947) (refusing to recognize cause of action for recovery by United States for tortious injury
to one of its soldiers).
238. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
239. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
240. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) ("[]s there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?").
241. 441 U.S. 677, 677 (1979).
242. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
243. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
244. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 739.
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new regulatory statute should be enforced through private litigation.
Rather than confronting the hard political choices involved, Con-
gress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional obligation and leave
the issue to the courts to decide. When this happens, the legislative
process with its public scrutiny and participation has been by-
passed .... 245
Once again an earlier dissent by Powell ultimately was adopted by a
majority of the Court. Shortly after Cannon, in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,246 the Court rejected a multifactor analysis and declared that
"our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to
create the private right of action asserted."'' 7 The shift in focus was also
recognized explicitly by Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority in Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis:248
While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis
upon the desirability of implying private rights of action in order
to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given
statute, e.g., J.L Case v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be
determined is whether Congress intended to create the private rem-
edy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.249
The Court's recent decisions denying liberal creation of implied private
rights of action underscore the conclusion that major innovations in the
rights and remedies available under federal law are policy decisions for
Congress to pronounce. They are not to be resolved by the courts as a
matter of federal common law.
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers As-
sociation involved coastal fishermen who sought damages and other relief
in a federal court from various governmental entities of the federal govern-
ment and the States of New York and New Jersey. The fishermen alleged
that these entities destroyed fishing in the coastal areas adjacent to those
states because of discharges of pollution into those waters. Though multiple
legal questions were raised in the lower courts, the Court granted certiorari
on only three: (1) whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),
like the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA),
contained an implied right of action; (2) whether all federal common law
nuisance actions had been preempted by those acts; and (3), if not, whether
private citizens, as distinguished from the States, have standing to sue for
damages under the federal common law of nuisance. The Court, in an
245. Id. at 743. Compare this with Powell's first amendment views discussed above where
he emphasizes the importance of informed public debate of governmental affairs. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
246. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
247. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
248. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
249. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
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opinion written by Powell, decided that there was no implied right of action,
the two acts preempted federal common law, and thus, the Court need not
reach the third question.
Consolidating the position gained in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
250
and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,251 and reaffirmed in
the intervening decisions in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc.,2 2 California v. Sierra Club,253 and Universities Research Assoc., Inc.
v. Coutu,25 4 Powell in Sea Clammers reiterated that "[iln view of these
elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress in-
tended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private
citizens suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. '255 As to the federal common
law remedies question, Powell noted carefully that Illinois v. Milwaukee,
Wisconsin (Milwaukee 1)256 had held only that the federal courts had
jurisdiction "to consider the federal common-law issues raised by a suit
• .. by the State of Illinois against various Wisconsin municipalities and
public sewage commissions. ' 2 7 The question left open in Milwaukee I,
whether a private plaintiff ever could seek relief under federal common law,
again was not answered because Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee II),258
handed down contemporaneously with Sea Clammers, found that the Clean
Water Act entirely preempted the federal common law of nuisance.
At one level, these opinions are not "constitutional"; they concern
policies of statutory construction and judicial decisionmaking. Yet those
policies are grounded in the constitutional structure of separation of powers.
They call for an approach to statutory construction that curtails open-ended
legislative delegations and avoids unguided judicial resolution of important
questions of public policy. Where the fact or extent of congressional
innovation is significantly uncertain, the courts should resolve the uncer-
tainty against change. Adherence to this approach encourages Congress to
make the basic policy choices, as required by the Constitution, and to avoid
the inappropriate delegation of legislative authority to the courts.
In Powell's view, if Congress successfully can transfer its policymaking
responsibility to the courts in an obvious effort to avoid hard choices, then
it can evade the political accountability to the people that is essential for
the legitimacy of legislative power. And if the federal courts, constitutionally
insulated from the winds of popular opinion, accept and exercise that
legislative power, they will undermine their own role in the constitutional
250. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
251. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
252. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
253. 451 U.S. 287 (1981)..
254. 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
255. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14
(1981).
256. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
257. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 21.
258. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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scheme as neutral arbiter. 259 Finally, the principle of federalism also is
offended if a federal court, with its constitutionally limited jurisdiction,
extends its own "authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned
it to resolve." °
EQUAL PROTECTION
Justice Powell's more important opinions on equal protection include
his opinions for the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriquez261 and Batson v. Kentucky,262 his opinion announcing the holding
of the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke263 and his
brief concurrence in Plyler v. Doe.
264
Although Justice Powell has been vigorous in finding the equal protec-
tion clause to be a shield against invidious discrimination against individuals,
he has strongly resisted efforts to use that clause as the functional equivalent
of substantive due process to create new constitutional rights for groups or
classes of individuals. Thus in his opinion for the Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez, Powell stated that:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor
is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as
the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there
is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution....
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.
25
In San Antonio the plaintiffs were Mexican-American parents who had
attacked the Texas system of financing its public schools. The attack focused
on the disparities in funding levels among local school districts because of
primary reliance on property taxes. State funds for education were divided
among school districts on the basis of each district's assessed property. The
259. See United States v. Richardson, 418, U.S. 166, 180, 188-97 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Powell also warned in his Cannon dissent that "[t]he dangers posed by judicial
abrogation of the right to resolve general societal conflicts have been manifested to this Court
throughout history." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 744.
260. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 746 (1979).
261. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
262. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
263. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
264. 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
265. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1981).
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assessed values in different districts varied widely between urban and rural
areas and between rich and poor neighborhoods. The net results were wide
discrepancies in per pupil expenditures among districts. The poorer districts,
which often contained higher percentages of minority students, received
relatively smaller funds. The federal district court had found that since (1)
wealth is a suspect classification and (2) education a "fundamental" interest,
the state system could be sustained only if the state could show some
compelling state interest for its system, and that the state had failed to do
SO.
As in his opinion in McClesky, one of the Georgia capital sentence
cases discussed above, 26 Powell was unimpressed by the plaintiffs' statistical
evidence. Here the study presented had only surveyed about 10% of the
Texas school districts. "It is evident that, even if the conceptual question
were answered favorably to appellees, no factual basis exists upon which
to found a claim of comparative wealth discrimination.
' 267
One of the basic issues in San Antonio was under what circumstances
a standard of strict scrutiny should be applied to the state actions challenged
under the fourteenth amendment. Speaking for the Court, Powell held that
since the action involved could not be shown to have 'deprived,' 'in-
fringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some [constitutionally
protected] personal right or liberty, ' 261 strict scrutiny was inappropriate.
The Texas action should instead "be scrutinized under judicial principles
sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to
the States under the Constitution. ' 269 In his opinion, Powell returned to
two of his familiar themes, federalism and judicial restraint. As to feder-
alism, Powell wrote:
It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the
Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship be-
tween national and state power under our federal system. Questions
of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining
whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption
of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous
judicial scrutiny. While "[t]he maintenance of the principles of
federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the
pertinent constitutional provisions under which this Court examines
state action," it would be difficult to imagine a case having a
greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now
before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing
public education presently in existence in virtually every State.
270
266. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying
text (discussing McCleskey).
267. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 27.
268. Id. at 38.
269. Id. at 39.
270. Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
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As to judicial restraint, Powell stated:
In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from
imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could
circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimenta-
tion so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems
and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions. 271
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior
to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 50
States, especially where the alternatives proposed are only recently
conceived and nowhere yet tested.272
These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate
solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic
pressures of those who elect them. 273
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakk a 4 the Court was
fractured over the application of the equal protection clause to the admis-
sions program of the Medical School of the University of California at
Davis. That program had a "quota system" that effectively reserved 16
places in an entering class of 100 for members of "minority groups"
including blacks, Chicanos, Asians and American Indians. The policy was
challenged by Bakke, a white male applicant who had twice been denied
admission. The Supreme Court of California held that the admissions
program violated the equal protection clause of the United States Consti-
tution, ordered Bakke admitted, and forbade the University from taking
race into account as a factor in future admissions decisions. A closely
divided Court (1) upheld the California court's judgment finding the ad-
missions program unconstitutional and ordering Bakke admitted but (2)
reversed the enjoining of the University from according any consideration
to race in its ongoing admissions process. Justice Powell's vote was decisive
to this result. He was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist and Stevens in the former and by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun in the latter. Powell wrote a long opinion on each
set of issues, parts of which were joined by various justices, and others
that stood alone.
Rejecting the "color blind" approach, Powell started his equal protec-
tion analysis with the observation that not all racial or ethnic classifications
are per se invalid. Thus, the critical process became "the level of judicial
scrutiny to be applied to the special admissions program." 27-5 Powell con-
271. Id. at 43.
272. Id. at 55.
273. Id. at 58-59.
274. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
275. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
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cluded that since "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect," they "call for the most exacting judicial examination.
' 276
Powell then set forth the history of the equal protection clause since
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. He observed that
[i]t was relegated to decades of relative desuetude while the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, after a short germinal
period, flourished as a cornerstone in the Court's defense of prop-
erty and liberty of contract .... It was only as the era of substantive
due process came to a close . . . that the Equal. Protection Clause
began to attain a genuine measure of vitality.
277
Powell rejected the argument based on the immediate post-Civil War origins
of the fourteenth amendment that it should be applied differently to whites
than to blacks. He characterized as a "two-class theory" the argument that
"discrimination against members of the white 'majority' cannot be suspect
if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign.' "218 He stated that "[t]he
clock of our liberties ... cannot be turned back to 1868 .... It is far too
late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits
the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater
than that accorded others." 279 He also observed that "[t]here is no principled
basis for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude'
and which would not.
280
Thus whenever a state "denies an individual opportunities or benefits
enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background," it
"must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible
and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary . . . to
the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.
' 28 '
Powell then examined each of the four asserted purposes of the Univ-
ersity's special admissions program and found that none was substantial
enough to support the use of the suspect classification. He distinguished
other precedents involving affirmative action on the grounds that they had
been predicated upon "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations. ' 282 Powell asserted that without such
276. Id. at 291.
277. Id. at 291-92.
278. Id. at 294-95.
279. Id. at 295. Kahn interprets Powell's rejection of this argument as "endorsing" the
color-blind principle, though he later adds that Powell does not make it the determinative test
but only "a factual interest to be represented within the balance." Kahn, supra, note 1, at 6-
9. I do not agree with Kahn's characterization. I view Powell as rejecting both the "two
classes" and "color blind" bright line approaches because he believes either could lead to
extremes in certain factual contexts. In their place, he substitutes a "two step" equal protection
test, described below, for determining the constitutionality of law or regulations affording
racial, religious or sexual preferences.
280. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296.
281. Id. at 305.
282. Id. at 307.
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findings, "it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in
helping one individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the
government has no compelling justification for inflicting such harm. ' ' u3 The
Constitution, in Powell's view, does not permit the Davis Medical School
faculty "to convert a remedy [affirmative action] heretofore reserved for
violations of legal rights into a privilege [that could be granted] ... to
whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination."
Finally, while recognition of race is one factor that can appropriately be
taken into consideration in pursuit of the goal of a diverse student body,
Powell held that race must be balanced with other factors.u5 The consti-
tutional fault of the Davis program was that it "focused solely on ethnic
diversity." 6 "It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano
that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an
entering class. ' '2 87 "At the same time, the preferred applicants have the
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class. '288 Powell then cited the
Harvard Admissions Program as one that would pass equal protection
muster because "fuin such an admissions program, race or ethnic background
may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats." 2 9
Powell's opinion in Bakke set the general framework for subsequent
decisions dealing with the constitutionality of "affirmative" action programs
283. Id. at 308-09.
284. Id. at 310.
285. Powell's earlier opinion for the Court in Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), discussed the constitutional relevance of a state's
objective of encouraging diversity and pluralism in the field of education based on recognition
of differences in religious beliefs. In that context, he observed that, in the balancing required
where both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause are involved, "[o]ne factor
of recurring significance in this weighing process is the potentially divisive political effect of
an aid program." Id. at 795. Powell quoted Black and Harlan to warn against evils of civil
and political strife that can flow from competition among religious groups for preferential
governmental support or favors, and contrasted that evil with the benefits of non sectarian
political diversity. Id. at 796 n.54. He observed that "we know from long experience with
both Federal and State Governments that aid programs of any kind tend... to generate their
own aggressive constituencies .... In this situation, where the underlying issue is the deeply
emotional one of Church-State relationships, the potential for seriously divisive political
consequences needs no elaboration." Id. at 797. Powell did not develop this point in Bakke,
but it is reflected in his view that race alone constitutionally cannot be the determinative factor
for admissions, while it may be considered if it is one of several other factors to be weighed
in striking an overall balance. In that balancing context, political polarization along social
lines would be less likely to develop. Thus one of the purposes of the fourteenth amendment
could be viewed as analogous to one of the first amendment's purposes to protect against
public strife and political division along racial lines. Id. See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 414, 416-17 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
286. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
287. Id. at 319.
288. Id. at 319-20.
289. Id. at 317.
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and the Equal Protection Clause. These include Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education,290 Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Asso-
ciation v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,291 United States v.
Paradise,292 and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,
California.
293
In his brief concurring opinion in Plyler v. Doe,29 Powell agreed that
a Texas statute that barred the children of illegal aliens from its schools
was impermissible under the equal protection clause. Powell pointed out
that the children "are excluded only because of a status resulting from the
violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact that
they remain in our country unlawfully. The ... children are innocent in
this respect." 295 Thus he concluded that a "legislative classification that
threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents
cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "296
Justice Powell's opinion for the majority in Batson v. Kentucky held
that "purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a
defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection
that a trial by jury is intended to secure. ' 297 Powell pointed out that the
jury "has occupied a central position in our system of justice by safeguarding
a person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by
prosecutor or judge," and thus the affirmative right to trial by jury
reinforces the equal protection clause's constraints on prosecutors' use of
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors "solely on account of
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." 29 The
difficult issue addressed in this opinion was the standard for determining
when such a constitutionally impermissible result has occurred. The Court
found that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." 299
This might be done through showing a pattern of past strikes against black
290. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that a school board plan providing preferential protection
against layoffs to "Blacks, American Indians, Orientals and those of Spanish descent" violated
the equal protection clause).
291. 478 U.S. 421, 483 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
292. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding a district court order requiring that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety award promotions from privates to corporals in the state police
to at least 50 percent blacks until approximately 25 percent of the corporals were black).
293. 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding county promotion plan in favor of women employees
that permitted women to be promoted over male employees with higher test scores).
294. 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982).
295. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 (1982).
296. Id. at 239.
297. 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
298. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
299. Id. at 96.
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jurors or by statements of the prosecutor during the voir dire. Once a
defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to
"articulate a neutral explanation" for challenging the black jurors that is
"related to the particular case." 3 °
From these later opinions and Powell's Bakke opinion, the proposition
emerges that where evidence exists of systematic denial of equal opportunity
because of race or sex, affirmative action designed to correct or catch up
by achieving a more representative balance within a class by giving preference
to members of the historically disadvantaged minority does not offend equal
protection. But absent such sins of the parents, their children may not be
discriminated against to prefer minorities as such. To be constitutional,
preference on a racial, religious or sexual basis must occur as a result of a
broader, more balanced process that furthers other legitimate goals, such
as "diversity" in education or other social activities. Thus, once the bright
line test of compensation for historic, deliberate discrimination is passed,
purpose rather than effect controls whether the preference is or is not
constitutional. And since stated purpose alone cannot be determinative,
judges must enter the labyrinth of groping for "true intent" and weighing
its social merit. In that complex process, as I suggested above in discussing
possible parallels between Powell's views in Bakke and establishment clause
cases,301 avoidance of political polarization along racial or religious lines
appears to be an important factor to Powell. Because such polarization is
more likely to occur when affirmative action is direct, overt and single-
purposed, such discrimination is unlikely to pass constitutional muster.
Conversely, some discrimination or preference on a racial, religious or
sexual basis is likely to be constitutionally permissible when necessary to
implement social goals of "diversity" or "pluralism." In this unavoidably
gray area, predictability is hard to come by and form will often command
a premium. But that uncertainty is the price that Powell obviously feels
must be paid as an alternative to the greater social evils likely to flow from
adoption of either of the two "bright line" alternatives-the color blind
imperative or unlimited deference to legislative preferences.
SUBSTANTrVE Dum PRocEss
Powell's forays into substantive due process are relatively rare. His
most significant decisions in this area are his plurality opinion in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, Ohio0 and his opinion for the Court in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc.30 3
Moore involved a municipal housing ordinance that limited occupancy
of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Under the ordinance,
"family" was defined in a way that did not include grandchildren. A
300. Id. at 98.
301. See supra note 285.
302. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
303. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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grandmother whose grandchild came to live with her was convicted of
violating the ordinance and sentenced to 5 days in jail and fined $25.
Writing for himself and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, Powell
found that the ordinance was invalid because it intruded upon "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life" which was
protected by due process.? 4
At the same time, Powell warned:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field
for this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives
enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the
guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As
the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the
predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of
this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it does
not counsel abandonment....
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful "respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society".... Our decisions establish that the Consti-
tution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values .... 301
Powell's opinion for the Court in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., which commanded the support of six justices,
is probably the most important of recent abortion cases besides Roe v.
Wade.301 The main insights Akron affords into Powell's judicial philosophy
are his beliefs (1) in an implied constitutional right of privacy, (2) that the
right of privacy "encompasses a woman's right to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy" 307 and (3) that "the doctrine of stare decisis, while
perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine
that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law. ' 308
PROCEDURAL DuE PROCESS
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge'°9 sets
forth the most recent controlling analysis for determining due process
requirements in administrative proceedings to terminate "benefits" or "en-
304. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
305. Id. at 502-04.
306. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
307. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419 (1983).
308. Id. at 419-20.
309. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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titlements." There, substantially restricting the scope of Goldberg v. Kelly,310
the Court determined that procedural due process did not require that a
current beneficiary of social security disability benefits payments be afforded
opportunity for a trial type "evidentiary hearing" before termination of his
benefits. The principal importance of the opinion is the three-step analysis
it sets forth for determining what process is due in the context of admin-
istrative proceedings:
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of
the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.3"
The procedures under scrutiny in Mathews provided for notice to a
disability payments recipient of a proposed determination that his disability
had ceased, together with an explanation for that conclusion and advice as
to his appellate rights. The regulations provided that if the recipient sought
agency reconsideration and reconsideration were denied, the recipient had
a right to a nonadversarial hearing before an administrative law judge and,
if the results before the judge were adverse to him, he might request
discretionary review by an agency appeals council. Finally, the recipient
could obtain judicial review. No provision authorized a stay of the cut-off
of benefits beyond the originally determined cut-off date during this agency
and judicial appeal process, but if an appellant ultimately prevailed, he was
entitled to retroactive payments.
The thrust of the due process challenge was that an appellant was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing before his disability payments were ter-
minated. The challenger relied on a broad reading of Goldberg v. Kelly for
the proposition that such a hearing was required prior to any temporary
deprivation.
Applying the three part test to these facts, Powell found, first, that a
disability benefit was not based on financial need. Therefore, while its
.suspension would produce hardships in some cases, the benefit is quanti-
tatively different from the welfare payments involved in Goldberg which
were given only "to persons on the very margin of subsistence.
' 312
Second, turning to the reliability of the decisional system challenged,
Powell found it adequate. He acknowledged that errors did occur and that
"credibility and veracity [of witnesses] may be a factor in the ultimate
310. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
311. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
312. Id. at 340.
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disability assessment in some cases. '313 "But," he concluded, "procedural
due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding
process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. The
potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the
decisionmaker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg."P31 4
Again Powell found statistical evidence unpersuasive: "although we view
such information as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case. ' ' 315
Finally, looking at the Government's interests, the most visible burden
of providing an evidentiary hearing upon demand would be the incremental
costs, which "would not be insubstantial. ' 31 6 While these extra costs alone
were not controlling, they "may in the end come out of the pockets of the
deserving since resources available for any particular program of social
welfare are not unlimited." 317
In striking "the ultimate balance," 318 Powell found that the procedures
assured fairness. He concluded:
In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged
by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that
the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the
entitlement claims of individuals .... This is especially so where,
as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant
with an effective process for asserting his claim prior to any
administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary
hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial
of his claim becomes final. 319
Some measure of Mathews' impact as precedent is reflected in the fact
that Shepard's reports it has been cited more than 2700 times.
THE REsULTING OVERVIEw
When the opinions of Justice Powell discussed above are viewed as a
whole, several themes emerge. One is Powell's balancing approach that
numerous authors have noted and often compared to that of the second
Justice Harlan. Also, as we saw in Harlan's opinions, there is careful,
pragmatic attention to the facts of each case, with particular concern to see
that the spirit of a constitutional protection prevails in changing times and
justice is in fact meted to the individuals involved. An example is Powell's
belief in an implied right of privacy, which as we have seen, underlies both
313. Id. at 344.
314. Id. at 344-45.
315. Id. at 347.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 348.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 349.
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his fourth amendment and abortion opinions. It is also manifest in his
"Living Constitution" approach to eighth amendment cases. Yet while
changing social values may broaden constitutional protections, Powell is
steadfast that they cannot be used to narrow the scope of these protections
as they existed at the time of their adoption. Thus, in the proportionality,
establishment clause, and equal protection cases, Powell looks not only at
contemporary society but also back into history for guiding principles.
We also see that Powell's principal focus in constitutional cases is on
individuals instead of groups. This is seen in his establishment clause
opinions and in Bakke where he warns against the dangers of polarization
along religious or racial lines likely to flow when the state creates conditions
that lead to political competition based on either factor. It is reflected in
his refusal to let statistical studies be determinative in his opinions in capital
punishment, establishment clause, and procedural due process contexts. It
is also apparent in his reluctance to expand the equal protection clause
beyond protection against invidious discrimination against a particular in-
dividual to strike down state laws because of speculative effects on classes
or groups. This restricted view of the equal protection clause ties into two
other themes in his opinions. They are the Justice's awareness of the historic
roots of the common law and our Constitution and his respect for "our
federalism." In these respects, he is like his immediate predecessor and
fellow Southerner, Justice Black.
Finally, his steadfast refusal to find implied rights of action in federal
statutes and his view on the narrow scope of federal common law reveal
his commitment to the separation of powers principle and his view of the
restricted role of federal judges as policymakers in areas that are the
traditional realms of the legislature. This is to be distinguished from his
belief that it is the duty of the Court to give lower courts guidance on
Constitutional issues and his closely related respect for stare decisis.
Apart from these individual themes, the overriding general conclusion
is that while Justice Powell has written what he believes to be relevant
today, he has always seen today in the broader context of the past centuries
of our Anglo-American history. This combination of realism and historical
perspective should keep Justice Powell's opinions alive and relevant for
future generations.
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